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AS APPLIED TO TORT LAW IN WISCONSIN
INTRODUCTION
In resolving the rights of parties involved in a tort action where
there is a conflict-of-laws problem present, a decision must be made as
to which procedural and which substantive law will govern. The Lex
Foriz, the law of the forum where the action is brought, controls the
remedies of the parties and determines what procedural law is applic-
able.1 The Lex Loci Delicti, the law of the place where the tort was
committed, governs generally the substantive rights of parties. 2 In the
last few years there has been a trend toward application of the Lex
Domicilii, the law of the domicile of the parties, in place of the lex loci.
To date the use of lex domicilii has been limited strictly to the issue of
the capacity of family members to sue one another in tort for personal
injury. Which "conflict-of-laws" rule the forum state will apply be-
comes important when the state of domicile and the state where the
tort occurred have different substantive law. It will be the purpose of
this paper to explore the various ramifications of this problem.
THE EXTENT OF APPLICATION OF LEX DOMIClLII
In 1959 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Haumschild v. Con-
tinental Casualty Co.3 that henceforth in tort actions, the law of domi-
cile would be applied in determining any incapacity to sue based on a
family relationship. In this case, the plaintiff was injured in an auto-
mobile accident due to the negligence of her husband while both were
traveling in California. Both parties were domiciliaries of Wisconsin.
Prior to this decision, the question of capacity to sue would have been
decided by resort to the substantive law of California,4 but the court
overruled six cases and partially overruled two others in holding that
Wisconsin substantive law would control this issue.-
I RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, §585 (1934).
2
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs, §378 (1934). The reason for the usual
rule of tort liability has been stated by justice Holmes in Western Union v.
Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914):
•.. it is established as the law of this court that when a person recovers
in one jurisdiction for a tort committed in another he does so on the
ground of an obligation incurred at the place of the tort that accom-
panies the person of the defendant elsewhere, and that is not only the
ground but the measure of the maximum recovery.
3 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W. 2d 814 (1959).
4 Under California law a wife may not sue her husband in tort. Peters v.
Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909).
5 Cases overruled by Haumschild: Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W.
342 (1931); Forbes v. Forbes, 226 Wis. 477, 277 N.W. 112 (1938); Boure-
stom v. Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939); Garlin v. Garlin, 260
Wis. 187, 50 N.W. 2d 373 (1951); Scholle v. Home Mutual Casualty Co., 273
Wis. 387, 78 N.W. 2d 902 (1956); Hansen v. Hansen, 274 Wis. 262, 80 N.W.
2d 230 (1956). Cases partially overruled: Nelson v. American Employers'
Insurance Co., 258 Wis. 252, 45 N.W. 2d 681 (1951); Jaeger v. Jaeger, 262
Wis. 14, 53 N.W. 2d 740 (1952).
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While the legal writers are practically unanimous in their approval
of the rule in Haumschild,6 few courts have so held to date. Apparently
the first state to apply lex domicilii was California. In Emery v.
Emery7 one defendant was driving the family automobile at his father's
direction. The car was involved in an accident in the state of Idaho and
the driver-defendant's unemancipated minor sisters, passengers in the
car, were injured. They brought suit against both their father and
brother, as did their mother who attempted to recover for medical and
other care she had rendered. The parties were all domiciled in Califor-
nia. The court held that although Idaho substantive law governed as
to the degree of negligence to be proved, California law would be ap-
plied to determine whether any disabilities or immunities existed be-
cause:
That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and
regulating the incidents of the family relationship and it is the
only state in which the parties can, by participation in the legisla-
tive processes, effect a change in those incidents. 8
In the case of Pittman v. Dieter,9 a widow was permitted to sue her
husband's estate for injuries sustained by her in an accident in which
her husband was killed. The accident occurred in Florida where such
action was barred.' 0 The parties were domiciled in Pennsylvania,
whose substantive law also denied the right to sue." The court felt
that the reason for the rule was to preserve domestic harmony and
since this expressed a policy of domestic relations the law of domicile
would govern. Recognizing the fact that such actions are rarely prose-
cuted unless liability insurance is present, the court felt the real issue
was "whether the possibility of collusion is so great as to outweigh the
logical reasons for bringing the suit,"' 2 and decided that it was not,
especially since the husband was now deceased. 3
6 See, among others, CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
LAWS, 250, 346 (1949); Seavey, Torts, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV., 517, 527 (1959);
Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Automobile Accidents, 1943 Wis. L. REV.
145; Kelso, Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current
Dilemmas, 33 IND. L. 3. 297 (1958) ; Schoetz, Conflicts of the Law of Torts
in Wisconsin, 31 MARQ. L. REv., 127 (1947).
745 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955).
s Id. at 428, 289 P. 2d at 223.
9 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 360, 26 U.S.L. Week 2120 (Pa. Ct. of Com. Pleas, Phila.
Cty. 1957).
Th Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950).
"1 Shoyer v. Shoyer, 36 Pa. D. & C. 673 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1939) states
the Pennsylvania view on this issue.
12 Pittman v. Dieter, supra note 9, at 2120. At least one state, New York, has
taken legislative steps to regulate the problem. In 1937, section 167 (3) of
the New York Insurance Law was enacted. It provided that "no policy or
contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because
of death or of injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury to or destruc-
tion of property of his or her spouse unless express provision relating speci-
fically thereto is included in the policy." For a discussion of the effect of this
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In Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corporation,'4 plaintiff was injured
due to defendant's negligence in an accident occuring in New York.
Thereafter the parties were married and subsequent to the marriage
plaintiff commenced her action in New Jersey, where they were both
domiciled. Although a New York statute permitted such actions,15 the
New Jersey court held that:
.. * it is sensible and logical to have disabilities to sue and im-
munities from suit arising from the family relationship deter-
mined by reference to the law of the state of the family domicile
when the suit is brought in that state [Italics added].16 Other-
wise the lex loci will be permitted to interfere seriously with a
status and a policy which the state of residence is primarily
interested in maintaining.17
Since New Jersey substantive law did not permit tort actions between
spouses,' 8 a demurrer to the complaint on this ground was sustained.
A different form of reasoning has been used in the federal courts
in arriving at the same result. In Alexander v. Alexander'9 an action
was brought by a wife against her husband, both being resident of
South Carolina, for malicious prosecution allegedly occurring in Flor-
ida. The Florida common law, preventing actions between spouses for
tort, was deemed to have been abrogated by the "equal protection"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus plaintiff could maintain
the action against her husband.
In the case of Morin v. Letourneau,20 plaintiff was injured due to
defendant's negligence while they were traveling in Massachusetts.
Both parties were domiciled in New Hampshire, whose substantive law
permits actions between spouses for personal torts. Following the acci-
dent, but before the lawsuit, plaintiff and defendant were married.
While the court did apply lex loci, i.e., Massachusetts' substantive law,21
statute on a conflict-of-laws problem, see Note in 15 WAsH. & LE L. REV.
266 (1958).
"3 Thus, in one case, Pennsylvania changed not only its conflicts rule but also
its substantive law concerning the capacity of one spouse to sue the other.
.4 27 N.J. 1, 141 A. 2d 34 (1958).
15 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW, Sec. 57.
16 None of the other states to apply lex dorniciX to date has placed this limita-
tion on the rule. This might lead one to believe that New Jersey is simply
applying lex fori, but an older case in that state, Clement v. Atlantic Casualty
Insurance Co., 13 N.J. 439, 100 A. 2d 273 (1953), would probably dispel that
notion. In that case an injured wife was allowed to sue her husband's insurer
in a direct action for a tort that occurred in New York, although the plaintiff
and her husband were New Jersey domiciliaries. This clearly shows that New
Jersey does not deny the remedy, but only denies the right of one spouse to
sue another.
17 Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra note 14, at 40.
Is Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A. 2d 595 (1954).
10 140 F. Supp. 925 (W.D.S.C. 1956). This issue was not contested on appeal;
see 229 F. 2d 111 (4th Cir. 1956).
20 102 N.H. 309, 156 A. 2d 131 (1959).
21 Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935), held that one spouse
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they determined that the marriage did not, under that law, extinguish
plaintiff's cause of action which arose prior to the marriage. However,
in dicta, Justice Duncan stated that:
Recent developments in the field of conflict of laws indicate
support in interspousal or family suits, arising out of wrongs
committed in foreign jurisdictions, for the view that the rights
of the parties should be determined in accordance with the law
of the domicile of the parties. [Citing the Emery,22 Kopli, 23
Haumschild, and Bodenhage 2 4 cases, as well as several law re-
view articles].
However none of these decisions have been referred to by the
parties and we find no occasion for purposes of this case either
to adopt or censure the views which they advance.2 5
Thus, the New Hampshire Court has opened the door to actions be-
tween spouses based on torts committed in states where such actions
would not be permitted. Wisconsin, in the Haumschild decision, be-
came the latest state to adopt the rule of lex domicilii.
APPLICATION OF THE HAuMscHILD RULE
Since prior law has been reversed in Wisconsin, it becomes neces-
sary to examine the practical aspects of the new conflicts rule as set
down in Haumschild.
As motorists travel through the various states they are probably
unaware that the law changes as they cross state lines. For example,
Wisconsin's substantive law permits interspousal tort actions26 and its
conflicts rule in tort actions is to apply the substantive law of the domi-
cile of the parties to this question.2 7 New York's substantive law also
permits suits between husband and wife 28 but the conflicts rule in that
state is to apply the lex loci to this matter.29
Illinois, on the other hand, has a statute denying the right of one
spouse to sue the other in tort, 0 and its conflicts rule is to apply the
law of the state where the tort occurred, even if it conflicts with Illi-
nois' substantive law.
3 1
could not maintain an action against the other for torts committed in Massa-
chusetts.2 2 Emery v. Emery, supra note 7.
23 Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., supra note 14.
24Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., supra note 3 and Bodenhagen v.
Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 5 Wis. 2d 306, 95 N.W. 2d 822 (1960) ; a case
similar in its facts to the Haumschild case, which, on rehearing, was held to
be governed by the rule in Haumschild.
25 Morin v .Letourneau, supra note 20, at 132.
26 WIs. STAT., §246.07 (1959), as construed in Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209
N.W. 475 (1926); Wis. STAT., §246.075 (1959).27 Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., supra note 3.
28 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW, §57. For a complete list of states which permit actions
between husband and wife, and which do not, see Comment, 31 So. CAL. L.
Ray., 431 (1958).
29 Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E. 2d 509 (1943).
3 0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §1 (1953).
31 Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N.E. 2d 593 (1948).
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Minnesota's substantive law also refuses to permit interspousal tort
actions but the conflicts rule applied in that state is hybrid in nature.
While Minnesota generally looks to the lex loci, it will refuse to permit
tort actions between spouses even should the lex loci permit the action,
on the ground that such suits violate the strong public policy of the
state. 32 Minnesota is then, in effect, applying lex fori to the question,
rather than lex loci or lex domiciiii. Several hypotheticals will serve
to illustrate the conflicts problem as to the rights and remedies of per-
sons in the several states.
A. WHERE HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE WISCONSIN DOMICILIARIES
While traveling in Illinois a husband and wife are involved in an
automobile accident and the passenger-wife is injured due to the hus-
band's negligence. The wife brings suit in Wisconsin. Under the rule
in the Haumschild case, the wife can maintain her action, because
Wisconsin will apply lex domicilii, i.e., the substantive law of Wisconsin,
to the issue of capacity to sue. 33
If the wife sues in Illinois, the state where the tort occurred, under
Illinois' present conflicts rule, that court will apply the lex loci,34 and
the Illinois statute 5 will prevent the wife from bringing her action.36
B. WHERE HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE ILLINOIS DoMICILIARIES
While the parties are motoring through Wisconsin, the wife is in-
jured due to her husband's negligence. If the plaintiff brings her action
in Illinois, the Illinois Court will presumably apply lex loci.37 Since
under Wisconsin law the action is maintainable, 3 the Illinois Court
will permit her to sue.3 9
But if under these same facts, the wife commences her action in
Wisconsin, the suit must be dismissed. The Wisconsin Court is bound
32 Only four states are known to have taken this position, and one, New York,'
has since reversed its position by statute. Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn. 204, 297
N.W. 744 (1941); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935);
Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W. 120 (1939); Mertz v. Mertz, 271
N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. 2d 597 (1936), but N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW, §57 now permits
such actions.
33 Supra note 26.3 4 Whitney v. Madden, supra note 31.
35 Supra note 30.
36 Whether the Illinois married woman's act denies the right or merely the
remedy of one spouse against another is apparently still a moot point. The
Wisconsin court in Bodenhagen v. Farmer's Mutual Insurance Co., supra
note 24, originally decided that the immunity was procedural in nature, but
on rehearing reversed themselves and refused to take a stand. The Illinois
cases thus far have been inconclusive.
3 7 Whitney v. Madden, supra note 31.
38 Supra note 26.
39 This assumes that Illinois does not apply the Renvoi principle. Penvoi is a
doctrine of conflict of laws developed in the nineteenth century which states
generally that a court, when it must resort to the law of another state, vill
adopt the conflict-of-laws rule of the other state to determine what substantive
law is applicable. For an exhaustive study of the doctrine, see Schreiber, The
Doctrine of the Renvoi in Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REv. 523 (1917).
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to apply the law of the parties' domicile," and Illinois, the state of
domicile, prohibits interspousal actions."'
C. WHERE HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE MINNESOTA DOMICILIARIES
Wife is injured due to her husband's negligence while they are in
Wisconsin. The wife has no cause of action in Wisconsin, because
Minnesota, the state of domicile, prohibits interspousal actions in its
substantive law.42 If she starts her action in Minnesota, she will still
be barred, because of that state's strong pulic policy against interspousal
suits. 43
If, however, the wife can overcome jurisdictional problems,4 4 she
can sue in Illinois or some other state which applies lex loci45 Her
suit should then be maintainable since Wisconsin substantive law, the
lex loci, permits interspousal suits.
D. WHERE HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE NEW YORK DOMICILIARIES
The wife is injured due to her husband's negligence while in Illinois.
She has no cause of action in either New York or Illinois since the
conflicts rule in both states is to apply leX loci,4 6 and lex loci is the sub-
stantive law of Illinois, which law forbids actions in tort between
spouses.4 7
But plaintiff can maintain her action if she brings it in a Wisconsin
Court of general jurisdiction. Since the state of domicile, New York,
permits such suits 4 8 Wisconsin must apply that law and also permit
the suit. Under the new Wisconsin law for jurisdictional require-
ments,49 obtaining in personam jurisdiction would be merely a matter
40 Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., supra note 3.
41 Supra note 30. See Gawlik v. Gawlik, Judge H. L. Neelen, 270-433, (Cir. Ct.
Milwaukee Cty., Feb. 2, 1960). Cited in 21 MIL. BAR Assoc. GAVEL 38 (1960).
42 MINN. STAT., §519.01, as construed in Karalis v. Karalis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N.W.
2d 632 (1942).
43 Kyle v. Kyle, supra note 32.
44 If the parties are neither domiciled in the forum state, nor did the tort occur
there, the wife may have difficulty getting in personam jurisdiction. But since
such suits rarely occur when a liability insurer is not in the picture, the
chances are excellent that the plaintiff can get service of the insurer in some
favorable state wherein the insurer does business.
45 Presumably any state would allow the action to be maintained, except those
states which apply lex domicilii, and the three states listed in footnote 32,
supra.
46 Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E. 2d 509 (1943) ; Whitney v. Madden,
supra note 31.
4" Supra note 30.
48 Supra note 15.
41 Wis. STAT., §262.01 (1959):
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that actions be
speedily and finally determined on their merits. The rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed does not
apply to this chapter.
§262.04 (2) :
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may ren-
der a judgment against a party personally only if there exists one or




of the husband and wife coming within the boundaries of the state and
the plaintiff getting personal service of a summons on her husband.50
In each of the foregoing situations whether or not there is liability
depends on where the action is commenced. An attorney confronted
with a conflict-of-laws problem in this area should be most careful in
choosing his forum.
This brings to light the problem of "forum shopping." A plaintiff
whose domicile has substantive law more favorable to him than is the
lex loci, may wish to bring his suit in Wisconsin in order to get the
benefit of his home state's law. He thus becomes a "forum shopper,"5 1
a non-taxpaying additional burden on the Wisconsin Courts. Thus
while this practice is deplored in Haumschild5 2 the rule in that case
would appear to foster it.
LImITATION ON THE HAumSCHILD RULE
In setting down the new conflict-of-laws rule in Wisconsin, that
questions of interspousal capacity to sue in tort were to be governed
by the law of domicile of the parties, Justice Currie carefully limited
its applicability:
Perhaps a word of caution should be sounded to the effect
that the instant decision should not be interpreted as a rejection
by this court of the general rule that ordinarily the substantive
rights of parties to an action in tort are to be determined in the
light of the law of the place of wrong. This decision merely
(a) A summons is served upon the person pursuant to §262.06; or,(b) ....
§262.05:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter hasjurisdiction over a person served in an action pursuant to §262.06 under
any of the following circumstances:
(1) In any action whether arising within or without this state, against
a defendant who when the action is commenced:
(a) Is a natural person present within this state when served; or(b) ....
§262.06:
A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and
grounds for personal jurisdiction as provided in §262.05 may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant by service of a summons as fol-
lows:
(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), (sub. (2) refers to disabilities,
e.g., age of the defendants, and is immaterial for our purposes)
upon a natural person:
(a) By personally serving the summons upon the defendant either
within or without this state.
(b) ....
50 This premise assumes the constitutionality of the above cited provisions. This
liberal statute has not as yet been tested.
51 ... a litigant . . . is open to the charge of forum shopping whenever he
chooses a forum with slight connection to factual circumstances surrounding
his suit" Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp. 148 F. Supp. 588, 592
(S.D.N.Y., 1957).
52"' ,... forum shopping' [should be] discouraged rather than tolerated." supra
note 3, at 139, 95 N.W. 2d at 819.
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holds that incapacity to sue because of marital status presents
a question of family law rather than tort law.5 3
This limitation will certainly curtail the efficacy of the Haumschild
rule. While a Wisconsin Court will permit a wife to bring an action
against her husband, for any other questions of substantive law it will
look to the state where the accident happened. Several facets of the
substantive law of negligence torts have different application in the
various states. The result then in a case with a conflict of laws problem
tried in Wisconsin may be a potpourri of the lex loci and lex domicilii
sufficient to nullify any value the Haumschild rule might have had.
The area where this problem will become most apparent is in the
field of the so-called "guest statutes". These generally provide that a
passenger in a motor vehicle has no cause of action against his driver
unless the driver has been guilty of gross negligence.54 About twenty-
six states to date have adopted guest laws with varying degrees of en-
forcement.55 Included among these are the neighboring states of Illi-
nois,5 6 Indiana,5 7 and Michigan.58 Thus, with a husband and wife
domiciled in Wisconsin but traveling in Illinois when the passenger-
wife is injured, complications arise. If the wife starts her action in
Wisconsin against her husband and/or his insurer, her complaint will
at least survive a demurrer on the ground of incapacity to sue. But she
must plead and prove wilful or wanton misconduct on the part of her
husband in order to recover because this is what Illinois substantive
law requires. Whereas, had the accident occurred in Wisconsin, proof
of ordinary negligence would have been sufficient to permit a recovery
by the wife. The incongruity of the situation is evident.
Another area of automobile tort law in which the question of lex
loci or lex domicilii becomes important is the contributory or compara-
tive negligence of the plaintiff as a defense. While Wisconsin has had
a form of comparative negligence statute since 1931, 59 only a few states
have enacted similar statutes.6 0 Most states have continued to follow
the Common Law rule that contributory negligence is a complete de-
53 Id. at 140, 95 N.W. 2d at 819.
54 ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 95 , §9-201 (1958):
No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest
* * . shall have a cause of action . . . against the driver or operator of
such motor vehicle . . . for injury, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been caused by the willful and wanton
misconduct of the driver or operator....
55 The most up-to-date collection of guest statutes is in 3 Wyo. L. J. 225 (1949)
and 34 IND. L. J. 338 (1959) which give the names of the states that have
adopted one.56 Supra note 54.5
'BuURN's IND. STAT., §47-1021 (1952).
58 MicH. CoMiP. LAWS, §256.29 (1948).
59 WIs. STAT., §331.045 (1959).
60 NEB. REv. STAT., §25-1151 (1933); S.D. LAWS, Ch. 160, p. 184 (1941) ; Miss.
-CODE, §1454 (1942) ; ARic. STAT. 27-1730.1, 27-17302 (1957).
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fense to an action in tort.61 Even these disagree as to whether the
defendant must plead and prove the contributory negligence, or whether
the plaintiff must prove his freedom from it.6 2 .
There is also wide cleavage on the question of contribution between
joint tort-feasors. Wisconsin, both in its case law63 and statutes, 64 has
always permitted contribution actions by the joint tort-feasor who has
indemnified the injured party against the other. Some twenty states 65
now have statutes abrogating the common law,66 and permitting con-
tribution, while a few more have followed this tack without benefit of
statute 
67
Other facets of substantive tort law which are handled in varying
manners in different states, and which may also tend to confuse the
relief available to a plaintiff, are the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa [oquitur, the availability of survival and wrongful death actions,
and the questions of imputed negligence as regards agency, assumption
of risk, and joint venture.
POSSIBLE EXTENSION OF THE HAUMSCHILD RULE
Because of the anomalous situation generated in Wisconsin by the
Haumschild rule and its limitation,6s which requires partial application
of the law of domicile and partial application of the lex loci it may be
appropriate to discuss the feasibility of a shift by Wisconsin (and
other states as well) to a full application of the substantive law of the
domicile of the parties. Such a position would have at least some
slight historical basis in Wisconsin. In Anderson v. Milwaukee and
St. Paul R. Co.," in an action for personal injury occurring in Iowa,
our Court refused to follow an Iowa statute granting a cause of action
but instead applied Wisconsin substantive law which denied the action.
The reason for this was stated by Chief Justice Ryan:
The action here is a personal action, for personal injury,
governed by the lex foa. This is almost too familiar a principle
for discussion or authority. 'A person suing in this country
must take the law as he finds it. He cannot, by virtue of any
61 Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K-B. 1809).
62 Most states say contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, to be alleged
and proved by the defendant. But in a few states absence of a contributory
negligence is part of the plaintiff's proof, e.g., West Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Liderman, 187 Ill. 463, 58 N.E. 367 (1900).
63 Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).64 Wis. STAT., §§272.59, 272.61 (1959).
65 For a partial list, see Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform
Practice, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 365.66 Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186 (1799), held that there was no right
of contribution between joint tortfeasors.67Duluth, M. & N. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931);Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Davis v. Broad St.
Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W. 2d 355 (1950).68Supra note 53.6937 Wis. 321 (1875).
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regulation of his own country, enjoy greater advantages than
any other suitor here.... He is to have the same rights which
all the subjects of this kingdom are entitled to.' [Quoting Lord
Tenterden in De la Vega v. Vianna, I. Barn. and Ad. 284] .70
This decision was later overruled7 1 and Wisconsin joined the ma-
jority of the states in applying lex loci with consistency to questions of
substantive law until the Haumschild decision was handed down.
The limited value of the rule in Haumschild has already been
pointed out. The harshness of the law of some foreign states, e.g.,
guest statutes and contributory negligence as a complete defense, is
hardly mitigated when the only deviation from the foreign law is per-
mitting plaintiff's complaint to survive a demurrer. The only state
where an individual can participate in the law making process is his
domicile. It is the only state with which he is connected in a permanent
way. In considering his potential liabilities and rights to recover for
injury, he will think in terms of the only law with which he is familiar,
the law of his state of domicile.
It must be remembered that the conflict of laws rule of applying
lex loci developed long before the advent of the automobile, when the
absence of an individual from his home state or country was much
more infrequent than it is today. Consequently there is a present need
for an individual to understand his legal rights and duties and not to
have them changed every time he crosses a state line. Further, his lia-
bility insurance premiums can be more accurately computed since the
insurer, knowing the domicile of its policyholder, can better evaluate
potential losses to be suffered defending these insureds.
Another valid reason for a complete shift to application of lex
domicilii in interstate tort cases is the difficulty encountered in deter-
mining the boundaries of the family law concept. Will Wisconsin,
under the limited Haumschild rule, have lex domicilii only govern the
capacity of one spouse to sue the other, or will it also cover the ques-
tions of parental immunity and a child's immunity from suit by a
parent? If lex doinicilii were to be applied in toto, the problem of where
to draw the line in defining the family concept would not be present.
On the other hand, the aim for uniformity and predictability
throughout the various states will be thwarted if one or more states
begin applying the substantive law of the state of domicile while the
majority of the states continue to follow lex loci. The matter of divided
domicile of the parties to the action may engender serious problems.72
70 Id. at 322.
71 Bain v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 120 Wis. 412, 98 N.W. 243 (1904).
72 At least one writer in the field has come up with a proposition to be applied
where it appears that the laws of two or more domiciliary states are involved:
COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, at p. 345(1949). ". . . I am quite willing to say that it seems to me that it would be
[Vol. 44
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One other factor to be considered is the lack of impetus to date.
No case except possibly the Morin 3 case, has yet come out actually
applying the entire substantive law of the domicile to an interstate tort
problem. Legal writers, with a few exceptions, are not advocating the
unlimited application of lex dornicilii.7 4 However, they agree substan-
tially that lex domicilii should apply to determine the question of one
spouse's capacity to sue the other for personal injury. It was largely
due to this advocacy that Einery,75 Koplik 6 and Haumschild were
decided as they were. It is dubious whether, without a campaign of
this sort, lex domicilii will ever come to be the applicable conflicts rule.
CONCLUSION
The possibility that Wisconsin (and other) courts may in the near
future complete the divorce from lex loci and apply solely the lex dom-
icilii as the substantive law as regards interstate torts has been explored.
While there are still several obstacles in the path of such a determina-
tion, not least important of which is the utter lack of case law favoring
this position, such a result could become a reality should a deserving
case be carefully and astutely presented.
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sensible to adopt whichever of the two (or more) domestic rules is more
favorable to the plaintiff. After all, the defendant did act for his own pur-
poses, and his act caused the damage; if the domestic rules of one of the
states would impose liability, if all had happened there, why not allow a re-
covery ?"
73 Supra note 20.
74 Seavey, Torts, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 527 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, Parental In'munity
in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 23 U. CHI.
L. REV. 474 (1956); Comment, 15 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 266, (1958); Packel,
Backward and Forward in Conflicts, 31 TEmP. L. Q. 117 (1957). But cf.
Kelso, Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws: Current Dilem-
inas, 33 IND. L. J. 297 (1958) ; Page, Conflict of Law Problems in Autonobile
Accidents, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 145, both of which seem to advocate a complete
shift to application of lex domicilii.
75 Supra note 7.
76 Supra note 14.
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